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a b s t r a c t
In this paper skill-biased technological change is linked with endogenous labor supply in
a growth model. Elastic labor supply allows us to explain how the observed increasing
unemployment of unskilled workers is caused by skill-biased technological change. Using
empirical data on wages and education, we construct the time series for the skill-biased
technology for Poland and the US. The empirical relevance of the model is tested by
calibrating it to empirical data for Poland over the period 1996–2006 and for the US over
the period 1992–2008. Our numerical analysis shows that if the skill-biased technological
change is not followed by the growth of total factor productivity, then output, physical
capital stock and consumption decline.With only twonecessary inputs, namely the share of
skilled workers in total population and the technology adopted by firms, this model allows
to simulate the future behavior of the labor market.
© 2011 University of Venice. Published by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Skill-biased technological change, which has led to a strong increase of the skill premium and sometimes also to the rise
in unemployment of unskilled workers, is debated extensively in the economic literature.2 The phenomenon of increased
non-production worker share in the wage bill in OECD countries in the context of skill-biased technological change (SBTC)
was studied among others by Machin and Van Reenen (1998) and Berman et al. (1998). Berman et al. (1998, p. 1246) found
that ‘‘SBTC was pervasive over the past two decades, occurring simultaneously in most, if not in all, developed countries’’.
This change occurred in the US as well as in other developed countries and the most affected industries were the skill-
intensive ones, namely machinery, electrical machinery and printing and publishing (Berman et al., 1998). They state that
less skilled workers sometimes also face increased unemployment. A very similar pattern can be observed in Transition
Economies, which also face skill-biased technological change and increasing unemployment of unskilled workers.3
Even though that skill-biased technological change has an impact on unemployment of the unskilled workers, the
literature usually assumes that labor supply is inelastic. However, Machin and Van Reenen (1998, p. 1217) state: ‘‘We cannot
∗ Corresponding author.
E-mail address: krzysztof.olszewski@nbp.pl (K. Olszewski).
1 The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the opinions of the National Bank of Poland.
2 A review of the literature can be found in Acemoglu (2002) and Machin (2008). Esposito and Steher (2007) provide a literature overview focusing on
Transition Economies.
3 Focusing on the period 1995–2003 and using data at the 14 industries level (DA-DN code) Esposito and Steher (2007) find evidence of SBTC in Transition
Economies. However, there is a sector bias as SBTC was concentrated in the skill-intensive and medium skill industries in Hungary and Poland. Another
study, performed by Lorentowicz et al. (2005) at a higher disaggregation level (23 ISIC industries) in the period 1994–2002 links FDI with an increase of
skilled labor share and wage inequality in Poland.
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deduce the full effect of technology on labor market structure without also closing the model by looking at the supply side
effects and the non-manufacturing sector, which is beyond the scope of this paper’’.
We aim to enrich the literature by including the SBTC process in a growth model with endogenous labor supply and
exogenous neutral technological change. Further on, we include the exogenously changing share of skilled workers in the
production function. We model a household which consists of skilled and unskilled workers, who optimally choose how
much to work and how much leisure to have. Nobody gets unemployed in the neoclassical sense and household members
share the income and do not suffer when they do not work. Under the assumption of elastic labor supply ourmodel explains
the observed decreasing labor supply of unskilled workers and links it to skill-biased technological change. The increasing
skill premiummakes it less valuable for the unskilled to work. We calibrate the model and test its empirical relevance using
data for Poland and for the US. Poland made a fast transition towards a market economy and it is the largest economy in
Central and Eastern Europe. The US are the most developed economy.
The paper is organized as follows. We model the production function with skilled and unskilled labor and solve the
household labor supply problem in Section 2. In Section 3 we provide empirical evidence for skill-biased technological
change and calculate its time series for Poland and the US. In Section 4 the model is calibrated and a numerical analysis is
performed. This allows to test the model’s empirical relevance. Section 5 concludes the paper.
2. The model
We consider an economy populated by an infinite number of households and firms. The economy is perfectly competitive
and everybody is a price taker. Households consist of skilled and unskilledworkerswho provide a fraction of their time to the
production of a representative good. Throughout the paper skill-biased technological change and total factor productivity
growth are strictly exogenous.
2.1. The productive sector
We set up the productive sector based on the specification of Caselli and Coleman (2006):
y = kα[(AuLu)
σ + (AsLs)
σ ](1−α)/σ . (2.1)
Here Lu is unskilled labor and Ls is skilled labor. The elasticity of substitution between skilled and unskilled workers is
ǫ = 1/(1− σ) and lies in the range (1, 2) (see Autor et al., 1998).
In addition to the Caselli and Coleman (2006)model, we allow theworkers to decide howmuch labor they supply and put
the model in a growth framework. The households live infinitely. Each household consists of an exogenously given fraction
u of unskilled workers and a fraction 1 − u of skilled workers. Each type of worker is endowed with one unit of time. The
unskilled (skilled) worker devotes a fraction of time l(h) to work and the residual 1− l(1− h) to leisure. In aggregate terms,
when N denotes the total available labor force, the labor input of unskilled workers is uNl and of skilled workers (1− u)Nh.
We divide the production function by N and get output in per capita terms:
y = kα[(Auul)
σ + (As(1− u)h)
σ ](1−α)/σ . (2.2)
First, we present the production function in a form which is convenient for the further analysis:
y = A1−αkα[(φul)σ + ((1− φ)(1− u)h)σ ](1−α)/σ . (2.3)
A denotes total factor productivity and φ and 1 − φ denotes the productivity of unskilled and skilled labor,4 respectively.
After profit maximization, thus differentiation of Eq. (2.3) with respect to the inputs ul, (1− u)h and k, we obtain the wages
and interest rate in equilibrium:
wl = (1− α)A
1−αkα[(φul)σ + ((1− φ)(1− u)h)σ ](1−α)/σ−1φσ (ul)σ−1 (2.4)
wh = (1− α)A
1−αkα[(φul)σ + ((1− φ)(1− u)h)σ ](1−α)/σ−1(1− φ)σ ((1− u)h)σ−1 (2.5)
r = αA1−αkα−1[(φul)σ + ((1− φ)(1− u)h)σ ](1−α)/σ . (2.6)
Besides the capital input the firms also need the labor input of skilled and unskilled workers. During the process of skill-
biased technological change firms adopt technologies which make skilled workers more productive. This has an effect on
the skill premium, which we obtain by dividing the skilled workers’ wagewh by the unskilled workers’ wagewl:
wh
wl
=
(
1− φ
φ
)σ(
1− u
u
h
l
)σ−1
. (2.7)
As usual in this kind of models, the skill premium is increasing in 1− φ and decreasing in (1− u)h.
4 Another way to think about φ is the ‘‘erosion effect’’ proposed by Galor andMoav (2000). New technologymakes some of the old skills obsolete. Skilled
workers are able to exploit technological change better than unskilled ones. Due to technological change the skilled workers become more productive,
while unskilled workers lose productivity.
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2.2. The households
The household consists of skilled and unskilled workers and maximizes the total utility of its members. Utility stems
from aggregate consumption and from leisure of both types of workers. We model the household side similar to Prasad
(1996). Income is equally divided between skilled and unskilled household members. This is a strong simplification, as
significant income differences between skilled and unskilled workers’ households can be observed. Usually both kinds of
workers live in separate households and only a small fraction of the skilled workers’ income is transferred to the unskilled
workers. However, the discussion on transfers between two types of householdswould add another decision variable, which
would affect the decision on how much to work. We also neglect unemployment insurance and employment protection,
which Mortensen and Pissarides (1999) use to explain how SBTC shocks lead to increased unemployment of unskilled
workers. For the point that we make in this paper our simplified assumption is convenient and it is necessary in order
to keep the model simple and tractable.
Workers can work only a fixed and given amount of hours, but they can choose the probability with which they supply
labor. By law of large numbers we transform the probabilities into fractions of time devoted to work. As in the real business
cycle literature, one week consists of 100 h, which workers can supply to the production process (see for example Prescott,
2004). People tend to work around 40–50 h a week. When the average hours are multiplied by the probability to work and
transformed into a fraction of the 100 h week, we get values for the labor input h and l which lie in the range (0, 1). In the
model workers are endowed with one unit of time. As discussed in Section 2.1 the unskilled worker devotes a fraction of
time 0 < l < 1 to work and the residual 1 − l to leisure, thus labor supply and leisure add up to 1. Moreover, the skilled
worker takes the same decision and devotes a fraction 0 < h < 1 of his time to work and the residual time to leisure 1− h.
The constraint l+ (1− l) = 1 and h+ (1−h) = 1 always holds, thus workers use all available time. As described above, the
household consists of a fraction u of unskilled workers and a fraction (1− u) of skilled workers. The individuals are born as
skilled or unskilled workers. The considered time period is too short to study endogenous education choice and we assume
that u can change but is exogenously given.5 Each type of worker decides independently of the other type’s decision, how
much labor to supply. The household’s utility function is given by
U(c, 1− l, 1− h) = ln c + Bψu ln(1− l)+ B(1− ψ)(1− u) ln(1− h). (2.8)
The parameter B is the weight on utility from leisure, ψ determines how much weight is put on the utility of un-
skilled and skilled workers. We suppress the time index from now on. The size of the household grows with the rate n
and the subjective rate of time preferences is denoted by ρ. The household maximizes the discounted stream of utility:
maxc,l,h
∫∞
t=0 e
−(ρ−n)tU(c, 1− l, 1− h)dt and has to obey the budget constraint:
k˙ = wlul+ wh(1− u)h+ rk− (δ + n)k− c. (2.9)
We set up the Hamiltonian and solve it:
H : e−(ρ−n)t [ln c + Bψu ln(1− l)+ B(1− ψ)(1− u) ln(1− h)] + λ[wlul+ wh(1− u)h+ rk− (δ + n)k− c] (2.10)
∂H
∂c
= 0 ⇔ e−(ρ−n)t
1
c
= λ (2.11)
∂H
∂ l
= 0 ⇔ e−(ρ−n)t
Bψu
1− l
= λwlu (2.12)
∂H
∂h
= 0 ⇔ e−(ρ−n)t
B(1− ψ)(1− u)
1− h
= λwh(1− u) (2.13)
∂H
∂k
= −λ˙⇔ r − δ − n = −
λ˙
λ
(2.14)
TVC lim
t→∞
e−(ρ−n)tc−1k = 0. (2.15)
After log-linearization of Eq. (2.11) and substitution in Eq. (2.14) we get the Euler equation
c˙
c
= r − δ − ρ. (2.16)
Now we combine Eqs. (2.11) and (2.12)
Bψ
1− l
1
wl
=
1
c
(2.17)
5 Based on data of the International Labor Organization (2008)http://laborsta.ilo.org, the annual average growth rate of the labor-force share with
secondary and tertiary education was 0.5% and 0.43% points over the period 1996–2005, for the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, the Slovak Republic
and Slovenia. Also the US data show that the share of skilled labor force is increasing.
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and Eqs. (2.11) and (2.13)
B(1− ψ)
1− h
1
wh
=
1
c
. (2.18)
Moreover, we combine Eqs. (2.17) and (2.18),
Bψ
1− l
1
wl
=
B(1− ψ)
1− h
1
wh
(2.19)
which after rewriting leads to the optimal allocation of leisure.
wh
wl
=
1− ψ
ψ
1− l
1− h
. (2.20)
From the firm sector we know the skill premium equation (2.7) and plug it into equation (2.20)
1− ψ
ψ
1− l
1− h
=
(
1− φ
φ
)σ(
1− u
u
h
l
)σ−1
. (2.21)
We rewrite it to obtain the optimal labor ratio for both kinds of workers
1− ψ
ψ
(
1− φ
φ
)−σ(
1− u
u
)1−σ
=
1− h
1− l
(
h
l
)σ−1
. (2.22)
2.2.1. Equilibrium
In equilibrium firms maximize their profits, thus Eqs. (2.5)–(2.6) hold. The household maximizes its utility subject to
the budget constraint and optimally allocates the available time of its skilled and unskilled members between labor supply
and leisure. The resource constraint of the economy is given by the budget constraint and also by the fact that each type of
worker spends all his time endowment on labor and leisure. In equilibrium the endogenous variables c∗, k∗ and y∗ grow at
the same pace, and unless there is no shock to the skill-biased technology, the labor input of skilled and unskilled workers
and their relative wages remain constant. We cannot provide an explicit solution of the equilibrium, because the state and
control variables k, c , h and lmutually depend on each other. The numerical solution is presented in Section 4. A comparative
statics analysis of the equilibrium, namely a small increase of the skill-biased technology is performed in Appendix A.1. In
the next step we introduce exogenous neutral technological change into the model.
2.2.2. Equilibrium with SBTC and TFP growth
In order to introduce neutral technological change into the model, we modify the production function. Total factor
productivity is denoted as A and its growth rate is A˙/A = g . The current productivity depends on its initial level A0 and
the growth rate g , with A = A0egt . A0 can be normalized to 1, thus in any point in time A = egt . Dividing the variables y,
k and c by A leads to output, capital and consumption per efficiency unit of labor. Now, output is called y˜ = y/A, capital
k˜ = k/A and consumption c˜ = c/A. The production function becomes y˜ = k˜α[(φul)σ + ((1 − φ)(1 − u)h)σ ](1−α)/σ . After
profit maximization, thus differentiation with respect to the inputs ul, (1− u)h and k˜, we obtain:
w˜l = (1− α)k˜
α[(φul)σ + ((1− φ)(1− u)h)σ ](1−α)/σ−1φσ (ul)σ−1 (2.23)
w˜h = (1− α)k˜
α[(φul)σ + ((1− φ)(1− u)h)σ ](1−α)/σ−1(1− φ)σ ((1− u)h)σ−1 (2.24)
r˜ = αk˜α−1[(φul)σ + ((1− φ)(1− u)h)σ ](1−α)/σ . (2.25)
The budget constraint per efficiency units of labor becomes y/A = c/A+ k˙/A+(n+δ)k/A. We use ˙˜k = ˙(k/A) = k˙/A−kA˙/A2,
plug it into the budget constraint and obtain after some rewriting
˙˜k = w˜lul+ w˜h(1− u)h+ rk˜− (δ + n+ g)k˜− c˜. (2.26)
The control variable consumption is measured per efficiency units of labor, however the agents are interested in per capita
consumption. This has to be considered in the utility function. Knowing that c = c˜A = c˜egt , the objective function becomes:
maxc˜,l,h
∫∞
t=0 e
−(ρ−n)tU(c˜egt , 1− l, 1− h)dt . We set up the Hamiltonian and solve it as described above.
H : e−(ρ−n)t [ln(c˜egt)+ Bψu ln(1− l)+ B(1− ψ)(1− u) ln(1− h)]
+ λ[w˜lul+ w˜h(1− u)h+ rk˜− (δ + n+ g)k˜− c˜]. (2.27)
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The resulting Euler equation is
˙˜c
c˜
= r − δ − ρ − g (2.28)
and as before,
Bψ
1− l
1
w˜l
=
1
c˜
and
B(1− ψ)
1− h
1
w˜h
=
1
c˜
(2.29)
describe the intra-temporal substitution between labor and consumption. Together with the TVC the unique optimal
behavior in equilibrium is described. If we set g = 0, the model is exactly as described in the previous section, since then
A = 1 in all periods. In order to analyze TFP growth, we set g > 0. In order to obtain consumption and the capital stock in
per capita terms, k˜ and c˜ have to be multiplied by A, which grows over time.
In equilibrium firmsmaximize profits, the householdmaximizes its utility and the budget constraint holds. If we assume
skill-biased technological change away, under any plausible TFP growth rate the economy will stay on the balanced growth
path and grow at the speed of exogenous technological progress. However, once skill-biased technology takes place, the
economymoves to another equilibrium. The reader should be aware that no closed form solution exists, and only a numerical
solution can be presented, which we do in Section 4.
3. Empirics on SBTC
In this section we calculate the time series for SBTC in Poland and the US. A simple method to obtain the productivity of
unskilled workers φ from empirical data is to rewrite the skill premium equation (2.7):
1− φ
φ
=
(
wh
wl
)1/σ(
1− u
u
h
l
)(1−σ)/σ
. (3.1)
Let us call the right hand side D, thus (1− φ)/φ = D. Solving for φ we get φ = 1
1+D , which is
φ =
1
1+
(
wh
wl
)1/σ(
1−u
u
h
l
)(1−σ)/σ . (3.2)
We observe the right hand side variables u, h, l and the skill premium, but need to make an assumption on the elasticity of
substitution. Following Caselli and Coleman (2006) we first set it to 1.4, thus σ = 0.285. The exercise is repeated with other
values for the elasticity, ranging in the interval (1, 2) as proposed by Autor et al. (1998). The parameter σ is exogenous, and
once fixed it remains constant. One can argue that the elasticity of substitution depends on the share of skilled workers in
total population. Because we do not have enough data to calibrate this parameter, we leave the elasticity constant.
3.1. Empirics on SBTC in Poland
Using empirical data for Poland6 in the period 1996–2006 we calculate the time series for φ. Data comes from the Polish
Central Statistical Office (2007). We focus only on full-time workers and look at the whole economy, because then the data
on wages and the data on economically active people (from which we calculate u) can be easily connected. In total we
have average wages for around 3–4 million workers. Workers are divided into five classes of education levels: tertiary (1),
post-secondary (2), vocational secondary (3), general secondary (4) and primary (5).
We first analyze the private sector. The development of the productivity of unskilled workers is presented for different
definitions of skilled workers. First, we consider workers with tertiary or post-secondary education as skilled and try
different values of the elasticity of substitution. The ratio between skilled/unskilled employed workers, the skill premium
and the skill-biased technology parameter φ is presented in Table 3.1.
There seems to be a rise in the proportion of skilled labor input to unskilled labor input as well as in the skill premium,
which is accompanied by a decline in unskilled technology φ. We also use other definitions of skilled workers. The left side
of Table 3.2 presents results under the assumption that all workers but those with basic education (level 5) are skilled. The
right side of the table shows another extreme, where we treat only those with tertiary education (level 1) as skilled. The
elasticity is set equal to 2, thus σ = 0.5.
Finally we analyze the whole labor market, including the private and public sector. Workers with general secondary
education and below (levels 4, 5) are considered as unskilled. Workers with at least vocational education (levels 1, 2, 3) are
considered as skilled. Here u is the share of unskilled workers in the total economically active population. The variables h
and l are calculated as the number of full-time employed workers divided by the economically active population in a given
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Table 3.1
Development of skilled/unskilled labor supply, skill premium and φ, private sector, Poland.
Year 1, 2–3, 4, 5 σ = 0.285 σ = 0.4 σ = 0.5
(1− u)h/ul wh/wl φ φ φ
1996 0.544 1.505 0.523 0.473 0.448
1998 0.575 1.557 0.458 0.431 0.417
1999 0.646 1.636 0.348 0.360 0.367
2001 0.799 1.691 0.218 0.274 0.304
2002 0.828 1.704 0.198 0.259 0.294
2004 0.930 1.719 0.152 0.224 0.267
2006 0.997 1.905 0.095 0.167 0.217
Table 3.2
Development of skilled/unskilled labor supply, skill premium andφ under σ = 0.5, for two different definitions of skilled/unskilledworkers, private sector,
Poland.
Year 1, 2, 3, 4–5 1–2, 3, 4, 5
(1− u)h/ul wh/wl φ (1− u)h/ul wh/wl φ
1996 4.752 1.278 0.114 0.092 2.215 0.690
1998 5.335 1.315 0.098 0.098 2.397 0.639
1999 5.886 1.398 0.080 0.113 2.486 0.588
2001 7.319 1.482 0.059 0.155 2.434 0.521
2002 8.133 1.505 0.052 0.166 2.441 0.503
2004 10.593 1.473 0.042 0.205 2.333 0.473
2006 11.733 1.400 0.042 0.237 2.413 0.420
Table 3.3
Development of skilled/unskilled labor supply, wage and φ under σ = 0.4 and 0.5, whole economy, Poland.
Year 1, 2, 3–4, 5 σ = 0.4 σ = 0.5
(1− u)h/ul w = wh/wl u φ φ
1996 1.086 1.288 0.559 0.319 0.357
1998 1.242 1.380 0.537 0.244 0.297
1999 1.339 1.422 0.503 0.211 0.270
2001 1.586 1.479 0.509 0.158 0.224
2002 1.622 1.518 0.497 0.146 0.211
2004 1.860 1.614 0.462 0.106 0.171
2006 1.982 1.564 0.419 0.105 0.171
skill category. The results under different elasticities of substitution between skilled and unskilled workers are presented in
Table 3.3.
Empirical data confirms the presence of skill-biased technological change in Poland. We apply the same approach to the
most developed economy, namely the US. This allows us to state that the observation for Poland is in line with the general
development in advanced economies and is not an exception.
3.2. Empirics on SBTC in the US
We calculate the productivity of unskilled workers for the US over the period 1975–2008. The data7 comes from the US
Bureauof Labour Statistics (2008). The education attainment levels are (1) college graduates, (2) less than a bachelor’s degree,
(3) high school graduates, no college and (4) less than a high school diploma. Wages are the median wages for the whole
population. As before we set the elasticity of substitution equal to 2 and calculate the skill-biased technology parameter φ
with Eq. (3.2). Workers with high school diploma or less are considered as unskilled. The data on SBTC shows the following
pattern. In 1975 the productivity of unskilled workers φ was 0.45. It declined in a nearly linear way until 1993 and took the
value 0.22 from then. From there on SBTC can still be observed, however the change of φ is much slower. The productivity
of unskilled workers φ takes the value of 0.21 in 2000 and declines to 0.18 in 2008.
Data availability allows us to look at the share of skilled workers in the labor force in the period 1992–2008. The share
of unskilled workers u was 0.48 in 1992, 0.42 in 2000 and decreases continuously, reaching 0.38 in 2008. As in Poland, an
upgrading of skills can be observed. It is important to explain why workers decide to invest in education, but this is beyond
the scope of the paper.
6 We obtain the longest time series among the Central and Eastern European countries for Poland from the Polish Central Statistical Office (2007). For
the other CEE countries data is present since 2004 only.
7 Recent data can be found on http://www.bls.gov/cps/earnings.htm#education, older data need to be requested by email.
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Fig. 4.1. Equilibrium values forwh ,wl , c , h and l (top to bottom) under skill-biased technological change, thus for decreasing φ values, Poland.
4. Model calibration and numerical analysis of the equilibrium
We calibrate the model based on empirical data and test whether it is consistent with empirical observations. First,
we calculate the unobserved skill-biased technology parameter φ using the previously presented method and calibrate the
model. In a second step, we perform a comparative statics analysis, namely fix the TFP growth rate and study the equilibrium
under different φ values. The economy in equilibrium is described by seven equations with seven unknown variables.
The variables of interest are: k, c , h, l, wh, wl and r . The seven equations are the optimality conditions in the firm sector
(Eqs. (2.4)–(2.6)), the budget constraint (2.9), the Euler equation (2.16), and finally the substitution of marginal utility from
leisure and consumption ((2.17) and (2.18)).
We have to calibrate some parameters and we apply the following procedure. The capital share is set to α = 0.35. The
elasticity of substitution is set to 2 (σ = 0.5). The initial TFP level A is arbitrarily set to 1, it only scales up k, c , wh and wl,
but has no effect on h and l. Moreover, the share of unskilled workers u is set to 0.509, a value observed in 2001 in Poland.
We still need to calibrate the parameters B, ψ , δ and ρ. The rate of time preferences ρ is set equal to 0.065 (see Benhabib
and Perli (1994) and Benhabib and Farmer (1994)) and the depreciation of physical capital δ is set equal to 0.06 (see King
and Rebelo (1999) and Stokey and Rebelo (1995)).
4.1. Calibration for Poland
First, we apply empirical data for Poland to Eq. (2.20) and getψ . The relative weight of the utility of unskilled workers in
total utility of the household is calibrated as ψ = 0.46. This value is in line with Prasad’s specification, who sets it equal to
0.4. The parameter B is set tomatch Eqs. (2.17) and (2.18) with empirical data and the procedure is as follows. In equilibrium
c˙ = 0 holds, thus r = δ+ρ holds.We apply this fact and the observed labor input h and l for differentφ values fromTable 3.3
to the interest rate equation (2.6) and find k∗. Now we plug k∗ into k˙ = 0 to find c∗. Applying c∗ to Eqs. (2.17) and (2.18) we
calibrate the weight on utility from leisure as B = 2.12783. Finally, we use the just calibrated parameters to find the wages
wl andwh.
Using the calibrated parameters σ , ψ , B, α, δ and ρ, which are kept fixed, the seven equations with seven unknowns
are solved numerically. This procedure is repeated for φ in the range 0.15–0.45, where φ decreases by very small values.
We obtain a monotone function for the variables k, h, l, c and wl and plot it. Only the skilled workers’ wage wh shows a
maximum at φ = 0, 22. The exercise is performed with steps of size 0.0001. Table 4.1 presents the results using steps of
0.01. The variables in equilibrium are presented in Fig. 4.1, the variable k is omitted to improve legibility.
In equilibrium, the variables behave as predicted8 by the comparative statics analysis on dl/dφ, dh/dφ and dk/dφ in
Appendix A.1. Increasing the productivity of the skilled workers and decreasing that of the unskilled workers results in a
higher skilled labor input h and lower unskilled labor input l as well as in an increased skill premium. We also observe
a decline in physical capital and consumption. This is only due to the fact that TFP is kept constant. Under our setting of
parameters SBTC decreases the productivity of unskilled workers more than it increases that of skilled workers, in relative
terms (e.g. a change from φ = 0.2 and 1 − φ = 0.8 by 0.01 means a decrease by 5% and an increase by 1.25%). We keep
u = 0.509 constant, the population consists of slightly more unskilled workers than skilled workers. Consequently, under
the above setting, SBTC decreases the output in equilibrium if it is not accompanied by TFP growth.
We now study the case of SBTC and TFP growth, thus φ decreases and A increases. Explicitly, we connect a 0.01 decline
in φ with an increase of A by 2%, starting from φ = 0.44 and A = 1. This is a simplification, which makes the analysis
8 Comparing the results of the two different approaches, we have to bear in mind that in the above analysis the ratio between h and l changes over time.
However, it is fixed for simplicity when we perform the comparative statics analysis in Appendix A.1.
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Table 4.1
Values of k, h, l,wh ,wl and c , in equilibrium, under fixed A = 1, Poland.
φ k h l wh wl c
0.44 2.0562 0.421487 0.425786 1.20168 1.0534 0.610986
0.43 2.05336 0.42476 0.42208 1.20685 1.0452 0.610142
0.42 2.05017 0.428009 0.418311 1.21182 1.03681 0.609193
0.41 2.04662 0.431236 0.414474 1.21658 1.02823 0.608137
0.4 2.0427 0.434444 0.410566 1.22114 1.01946 0.606974
0.39 2.03842 0.437634 0.406583 1.22549 1.0105 0.605701
0.38 2.03377 0.440808 0.40252 1.22963 1.00133 0.604319
0.37 2.02874 0.443967 0.398372 1.23357 0.991973 0.602826
0.36 2.02333 0.447114 0.394135 1.23728 0.98241 0.601219
0.35 2.01754 0.450251 0.389802 1.24078 0.972642 0.599498
0.34 2.01136 0.45338 0.385369 1.24405 0.962666 0.597661
0.33 2.00477 0.456501 0.380828 1.2471 0.952479 0.595704
0.32 1.99778 0.459619 0.376173 1.24992 0.942074 0.593627
0.31 1.99038 0.462733 0.371397 1.25251 0.93145 0.591426
0.3 1.98254 0.465847 0.36649 1.25485 0.920599 0.589099
0.29 1.97428 0.468962 0.361446 1.25695 0.909518 0.586642
0.28 1.96556 0.472081 0.356253 1.2588 0.898201 0.584054
0.27 1.95639 0.475205 0.350902 1.26038 0.88664 0.581329
0.26 1.94675 0.478338 0.345381 1.2617 0.874829 0.578464
0.25 1.93663 0.481482 0.339676 1.26275 0.862761 0.575455
0.24 1.926 0.484638 0.333775 1.26351 0.850426 0.572297
0.23 1.91485 0.487811 0.327662 1.26398 0.837816 0.568985
0.22 1.90317 0.491003 0.321318 1.26415 0.824921 0.565513
0.21 1.89092 0.494217 0.314726 1.264 0.811729 0.561875
0.2 1.8781 0.497456 0.307861 1.26352 0.798228 0.558064
0.19 1.86467 0.500725 0.300701 1.26269 0.784404 0.554072
0.18 1.8506 0.504027 0.293218 1.26151 0.770242 0.549891
0.17 1.83586 0.507367 0.285378 1.25994 0.755725 0.545512
0.16 1.82041 0.510749 0.277146 1.25798 0.740833 0.540923
0.15 1.80422 0.51418 0.26848 1.2556 0.725546 0.536112
Fig. 4.2. Equilibrium values forwh ,wl , c , h and l (top to bottom) under skill-biased technological change, thus for decreasing φ values, under TFP growth,
Poland.
significantly easier and the results more transparent. We know from empirical studies that exogenous TFP growth can be
set to around 2% per year (see e.g. Burda and Severgnini (2009)). The parameter B needs to be calibrated again. Now it is
calibrated as B = 2.19403. This value is slightly higher than in the case where TFP does not grow. As workers become more
productive, they need to spend less time in the production process, in order to keep the output constant. If they are aware
of the constant productivity growth, they value leisure a little bit more than they would if no technological progress were
present.
We see that under this setting a decrease of φ leads to a higher employment of the skilled workers, lower employment
of the unskilled workers, a higher capital stock and consumption. This result is presented in Table 4.2 and shown in Fig. 4.2.
We find that consumption and the capital stock grow, if SBTC is accompanied by a sufficiently high TFP growth.
Finally, we test the empirical relevance of the model. Fixing A = 1 and using the same parameters as described above,
we calculate the equilibrium for all observed years. We apply the productivity φ of unskilled workers and the share u
of unskilled workers in the economic active population that is actually observed in the given year. We calculate φ with
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Table 4.2
Values of k, h, l,wh ,wl and c , in equilibrium, under increasing A, Poland.
φ k h l wh wl c
0.44 1.63643 0.421483 0.425787 1.10938 0.972488 0.547036
0.43 1.66718 0.424756 0.422081 1.13667 0.984408 0.557315
0.42 1.69822 0.428005 0.418312 1.1644 0.996235 0.567689
0.41 1.72952 0.431232 0.414475 1.19259 1.007955 0.578156
0.4 1.76108 0.43444 0.410567 1.22125 1.019544 0.588706
0.39 1.7929 0.43763 0.406584 1.25036 1.030989 0.599338
0.38 1.82495 0.440803 0.40252 1.27993 1.042284 0.610053
0.37 1.8572 0.443963 0.398373 1.30995 1.053392 0.620835
0.36 1.88967 0.44711 0.394135 1.34044 1.064315 0.63169
0.35 1.92233 0.450247 0.389803 1.37139 1.075022 0.642608
0.34 1.95514 0.453376 0.38537 1.40278 1.085486 0.653577
0.33 1.98812 0.456497 0.380829 1.43464 1.095699 0.664601
0.32 2.02121 0.459614 0.376174 1.46692 1.105621 0.67566
0.31 2.05439 0.462729 0.371397 1.49965 1.115235 0.686754
0.3 2.08765 0.465843 0.366491 1.53281 1.124511 0.69787
0.29 2.12094 0.468958 0.361447 1.56639 1.133419 0.709
0.28 2.15424 0.472077 0.356254 1.60038 1.141929 0.720132
0.27 2.18751 0.475201 0.350903 1.63477 1.150002 0.731251
0.26 2.2207 0.478334 0.345381 1.66954 1.157603 0.742346
0.25 2.25377 0.481478 0.339677 1.70467 1.164691 0.7534
0.24 2.28668 0.484634 0.333776 1.74016 1.171232 0.764403
0.23 2.31938 0.487807 0.327663 1.77598 1.177178 0.775332
0.22 2.3518 0.490999 0.321319 1.81209 1.182477 0.786171
0.21 2.38385 0.494213 0.314726 1.84847 1.187067 0.79689
0.2 2.41552 0.497452 0.307862 1.8851 1.190905 0.807474
0.19 2.4467 0.500721 0.300702 1.92193 1.193924 0.817895
0.18 2.47729 0.504023 0.293218 1.95891 1.196055 0.828122
0.17 2.50721 0.507363 0.285379 1.99601 1.197219 0.838123
0.16 2.53634 0.510746 0.277147 2.03316 1.197334 0.847858
0.15 2.56456 0.514176 0.268481 2.07031 1.196316 0.857296
Table 4.3
Simulated and observed development of skilled/unskilled labor supply and skill premium under σ = 0.5, whole economy, Poland.
Year Observed 1, 2, 3–4, 5 Simulated
(1− u)h/ul w = wh/wl u φ (1− u)h/ul w =
wh/wl
1996 1.086 1.288 0.559 0.357 0.982 1.354
1998 1.242 1.380 0.537 0.297 1.168 1.424
1999 1.339 1.422 0.503 0.270 1.338 1.421
2001 1.586 1.479 0.509 0.224 1.473 1.534
2002 1.622 1.518 0.497 0.211 1.569 1.544
2004 1.860 1.614 0.462 0.171 1.927 1.586
2006 1.982 1.564 0.419 0.171 2.127 1.510
Eq. (3.2) and data from the Polish Central Statistical Office (2007). Using this value,we calculate the values of k, h, l,wh,wl and
c in equilibrium.We compare the calculated ratio of skilled to unskilled labor input (1−u)h/ul and the skill premiumwh/wl
with its empirical value. The results are presented in Table 4.3. The calculated values follow the empirical values quite well.
Differences can be observed, but they origin from the assumption of perfect competitive equilibrium. The model simulates
the agents’ optimal behavior in equilibrium, while the empirical data is just very close to the equilibrium. Employment
laws, government interventions and other economic factors which are not captured in the model make the agents choose
allocations that differ from our equilibrium. Moreover, our calibration is based on very few observations. Further on, we do
not observe the real hours worked, but calculate h as the share of full-time, skilled workers among all economically active
skilled workers. The same applies to l.
The numerical analysis shows that themodel is useful in explaining that SBTC and TFP growth lead to output growth and
increasing employment of skilled workers and declining employment of unskilled workers.
4.2. Calibration for the US
Calibrating themodel to the US shows that it is also empirically relevant for themost advanced economy. The calibration
is performed as in the case of Poland. Data on wages, employment and unemployment origins from the US Bureau of
Labour Statistics (2008) and covers the period 1992–2008. The elasticity of substitution is set equal to 2 (σ = 0.5) and
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Table 4.4
Simulated and observed development of skilled/unskilled labor supply, and skill premium under σ = 0.5, US.
Year Observed Simulated on 1992–1998 Simulated on full
sample
(1− u)h/ul wh/wl u φ (1− u)h/ul wh/wl (1− u)h/ul wh/wl
1999 1.397 1.594 0.422 0.220 1.433 1.574 1.412 1.586
2000 1.419 1.598 0.418 0.216 1.437 1.588 1.437 1.588
2001 1.447 1.600 0.414 0.212 1.477 1.598 1.465 1.598
2002 1.469 1.598 0.411 0.210 1.507 1.578 1.484 1.590
2003 1.498 1.582 0.406 0.211 1.499 1.581 1.499 1.581
2004 1.526 1.573 0.402 0.209 1.520 1.577 1.520 1.577
2005 1.535 1.585 0.400 0.206 1.541 1.584 1.541 1.584
2006 1.560 1.599 0.396 0.201 1.603 1.577 1.578 1.589
2007 1.629 1.622 0.385 0.189 1.672 1.601 1.672 1.601
2008 1.673 1.628 0.380 0.184 1.744 1.594 1.717 1.606
the parameters that enter the utility function are calibrated as ψ = 0.3912 and B = 2.4375 to match empirical data. Those
parameters are similar to those obtained for Poland. The weight of the utility of skilled workers in the households’ total
utility seems to be higher in the US. However, this can be affected by the definition of skilled workers. The workers in the
US seem to put a higher weight B on the utility from leisure compared to that from consumption than workers in Poland do.
In advanced economies leisure becomes more valuable than consumption, possibly because of the very high consumption
level and scarcity of leisure. The US data shows a very high employment rate.
We test the empirical relevance of the model. First, we calibrate the parameters based on the whole sample. Using the
calibrated parameters and observed skill-biased technology parameter φ we calculate the skill premium and ratio of skilled
to unskilled labor supply for the period 1992–2008. The observed and simulated values are presented in Table 4.4. The
simulated skill premium is 0.5% lower while the labor supply of skilled workers relative to unskilled ones is 1.5% higher,
on average. During the second test we calibrate the parameters for the period 1992–1998 and predict the development of
the economy in the following period. In this case, the parameters are calibrated as ψ = 0.39518 and B = 2.4681. The
average share of unskilled workers in the labor force for the first period is u = 0.449 and u = 0.401 for the second.
Now, the simulated skill premium is 1.5% lower than the observed one, on average. The labor supply of skilled to unskilled
workers is by 3% higher. Considering the relatively small error, the model is useful in predicting the reaction of the labor
market to a skill-biased technological change. Policy makers can predict the shares of skilled workers quite well, as they
observe the enrollment in schools and universities. Once the model is calibrated for a country, it can be used to predict the
reaction of unskilled workers to SBTC. Policymakers can take appropriate actions in order to sustain thewelfare of unskilled
workers.
When we consider SBTC as an exogenous process the model can explain the formation of the skill premium. The labor
supply of skilled and unskilledworkers in the US is very similar and stays constant over time. However, the share of unskilled
workers decreases over time, from0.48 in 1992 to 0.38 in 2008. This indicates that it is crucial to include the share of unskilled
workers in the population into the model. There is too few data to estimate the relation between SBTC and education
attainment, however the data indicates that also in the US the increasing skill premium makes education attractive.
5. Conclusion
This paper relates the change in the structure of the labor market to skill-biased technological change and endogenous
labor supply. Using elastic labor supply we show that skill-biased technological change can explain the observed increase of
unemployment of unskilled workers. Further on, we calculate the time series of skill-biased technology for Poland and the
US. Calibration of the model to Polish and US data and numerical analysis of the equilibrium shows its empirical relevance.
The model explains the significant employment drop of unskilled workers in Poland.
We add to the results of the mainstream SBTC literature by making labor supply endogenous. We deal with a
heterogeneous-agents model of economic growth and present numerical results. The major contribution of our model is
the observation that if skill-biased technological change is not followed by total factor productivity growth, then output,
physical capital stock and consumption decline. The model allows to simulate the economy and study the effect of SBTC on
the supply and demand side of the labor market.
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Appendix
A.1. Comparative statics — the impact of φ on l, h and k
In order to study the effect of a change in skill-biased technology parameter φ on unskilled and skilled labor demand and
the physical capital stock, we take the total differential of the three firms’ optimality conditions (2.4)–(2.6). This approach
follows Cieślik (2008). We know from the households’ optimality equation (2.20) that the supply of skilled and unskilled
labor depends on the skill premium. After substituting the wage for skilled and unskilled labor and rewriting, we get
Eq. (2.22), which we call S:
S =
1− ψ
ψ
(
1− φ
φ
)−σ(
1− u
u
)1−σ
−
1− h
1− l
(
h
l
)σ−1
. (A.1)
We use the following three equations which completely describe the economy: S, wh and r and differentiate them with
respect to φ, l, h and k. To simplify the notation, we use wl, wh and r , and the second subscript denotes the first derivative
with respect to the given parameter. In matrix notation we obtain:(
Sk Sl Sh
whk whl whh
rk rl rh
)(
dk
dl
dh
)
=
(
−Sφ
−whφ
−rφ
)
dφ.
We solve this system of three linear equations for dk, dl and dh, use the fact that Sk = 0 and after rearranging the terms
obtain the following expressions:
dl
dφ
=
−whkShrφ + whkSφrh + Shrkwhφ − Sφrkwhh
−whkSlrh + rlwhkSh − whlrkSh + rkSlwhh
(A.2)
dh
dφ
= −
rlwhkSφ − whlrkSφ − whkSlrφ + rkSlwhφ
−whkSlrh + rlwhkSh − whlrkSh + rkSlwhh
(A.3)
dk
dφ
= −
whhSlrφ − whφSlrh + Shrlwhφ − Shwhlrφ + Sφwhlrh − Sφrlwhh
−whkSlrh + rlwhkSh − whlrkSh + rkSlwhh
. (A.4)
In order to study the impact of the skill-biased technological change, and hence the decrease of φ, we need to determine
the sign of equations Eqs. (A.2)–(A.4). It is easy to check that Sl < 0, Sh > 0, Sφ > 0, whk > 0, whl > 0, whh < 0, whφ < 0,
rk < 0, rl > 0 and rh > 0, rφ > 0 holds. There are eight cases for the sign of Eqs. (A.2)–(A.4). (+, +, +), (+, +, −), (+,
−, −), (−, +, +), (−, +, −), (+, −, +), (−, −, +), (−, −, −). From the empirical point of view the case (+, −, −) and (+,
−, +) should be studied. Under this setting an decrease in φ leads to a decline in unskilled labor, which is consistent with
empirical observations.
The terms in Eqs. (A.2)–(A.4) are quite complicated andmake an analytical solution infeasible. The partial derivatives are
presented in Appendix A.2. Some of the parameters can be fixed: α = 0.35, ψ = 0.46, A = 1, k = 100 and u = 0.5. We
explain the choice of the parameters in detail. The capital share is assumed to be constant and around 0.35. The parameterψ
is set to 0.46 in order tomatch Eq. (2.20) with empirical data for Poland. The TFP is set arbitrarily to 1, in order to simplify the
equation. Also the capital stock k is chosen arbitrarily, because this value does not change the results of the analysis (A and
k disappear after simplification of Eqs. (A.2) and (A.3)). Finally, we treat workers with primary and secondary education as
unskilled,while the remaining ones are skilled. The share of unskilledworkers in the total population is quite close to 0.5 (see
Table 3.3). We are left with h, l and φ. Based on empirical observations, we put the parameters in intervals: 0.2 < l < 0.5,
0.3 < h < 0.5 and 0.15 < φ < 0.4. The motivation is provided in Section 2.2 and empirical values for φ can be found
in Table 3.3. Skilled workers work more than unskilled, thus we assume l < h. Due to data availability, we pretend that
only full-time employed workers are employed and the rest is unemployed. The interesting point is to find the relation
between φ, h and l, under which dl
dφ
> 0 and simultaneously dh
dφ
< 0. As no analytical closed form solution exists, we resort
to graphical analysis. From empirical data for Poland we obtain an average relationship between l and h. Thus, only two
variables, namely h and φ are left. A 3D graph of dl
dφ
and dh
dφ
is presented in Fig. A.1.
Repeating the procedure with slightly different parameter values results in qualitatively the same picture. For any value
of h there exists a range of the skill-biased technology φ, such that dl
dφ
> 0 and simultaneously dh
dφ
< 0 holds. This range is
the intersection of the two plots with the flat hyperplane that goes through zero (front of Fig. A.1). When u decreases, this
range moves to the left. When the ratio l/h decreases, the intersection of dh
dφ
with the flat hyperplane that goes through zero
moves to the right. Skill-biased technological change increases skilled labor supply and decreases unskilled labor supply.
The function dk/dφ is not plotted. It is positive for any observable φ value. This means that SBTC decreases the equilibrium
physical capital stock when TFP is kept constant.
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Fig. A.1. Graphical representation of dl/dφ (front) and dh/dφ (back) (Eqs. (A.2) and (A.3)) under u = 0.51, and l = 0.61 ∗ h, for the year 2001. φ on
horizontal axis, h on vertical axis. Values below zero are clipped.
A.2. Partial derivatives for comparative statics
whφ =
A1−α(α−1)kα(1−φ)σ−1(h−hu)σ ((h(φ−1)(u−1))σ+(lφu)σ )
− α+2σ−1σ ((α−1)φ((h(φ−1)(u−1))σ+(lφu)σ )−(α+σ−1)(lφu)σ )
hφ(u−1)
whh = −
A1−α(α−1)kα(1−φ)σ (h−hu)σ ((h(φ−1)(u−1))σ+(lφu)σ )
− α+2σ−1σ (α(h(φ−1)(u−1))σ−(σ−1)(lφu)σ )
h2(u−1)
whl = −
A1−α(α − 1)kα(1− φ)σ (α + σ − 1)(lφu)σ (h− hu)σ ((h(φ − 1)(u− 1))σ + (lφu)σ )−
α+2σ−1
σ
hl(u− 1)
whk =
A1−α(α − 1)αkα−1(1− φ)σ (h− hu)σ ((h(φ − 1)(u− 1))σ + (lφu)σ )−
α+σ−1
σ
h(u− 1)
rφ = −
A1−α(α − 1)αkα−1 ((h(φ − 1)(u− 1))σ + (lφu)σ )−
α+σ−1
σ (φ(h(φ − 1)(u− 1))σ + (φ − 1)(lφu)σ )
(φ − 1)φ
rl = −
A1−α(α − 1)αkα−1(lφu)σ ((h(φ − 1)(u− 1))σ + (lφu)σ )−
α+σ−1
σ
l
rh = −
A1−α(α − 1)αkα−1(h(φ − 1)(u− 1))σ ((h(φ − 1)(u− 1))σ + (lφu)σ )−
α+σ−1
σ
h
rk = A
1−α(α − 1)αkα−2 ((h(φ − 1)(u− 1))σ + (lφu)σ )
1−α
σ
Sh = −
(
h
l
)σ
l((h− 1)σ + 1)
h2(l− 1)
Sl =
(h− 1)
(
h
l
)σ
((l− 1)σ + 1)
h(l− 1)2
Sφ = −
(
1
φ
− 1
)−σ
(ψ − 1)σ
(
1
u − 1
)−σ
(u− 1)
(φ − 1)φψu
.
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